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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Curtis Evans appeals from his conviction on various 
fraud-related charges. The primary question presented, 
which arises out of Evans' judgment of sentence, is whether 
the district court erred in conditioning his supervised 
release on reimbursement of the cost of court-appointed 
counsel. See 18 U.S.C. S 3583(d). We conclude that it did, 
and therefore vacate that portion of the judgment. We also 
remand for further sentencing proceedings because of the 
inadequacy of the district court's findings supporting its 
determination of the amount of loss from fraudulent 
conduct. See U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1) (1997).1 
 
I. 
 
A federal grand jury returned a forty-six count indictment 
against Evans and eleven other individuals. Evans was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Additionally, Evans submits that plain error was committed by the 
seating of a juror who purportedly expressed an inability to be fair, and 
the wasting of a peremptory challenge on another juror who also 
purportedly expressed an inability to be fair. These contentions are 
unfounded. Alternatively, Evans contends that trial counsel's failure to 
move to strike either of these jurors constituted ineffective assistance 
of 
counsel. We will not address this claim on direct appeal. See United 
States v. Cocivera, 104 F.3d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1996) (recognizing that 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are"ordinarily more 
appropriate for collateral attack"). 
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convicted by a jury of nineteen counts of mail fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1341; two counts of use of a 
fictitious name to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 1342; three counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 1343; and one count of conspiracy in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 371. The fraud inhered in a scheme of staging 
automobile accidents and then submitting insurance claims 
for non-existent medical treatment. The scheme, which 
operated in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, was 
masterminded by Alexander Grichener, but Evans played 
an apparently significant role in its Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania operations, particularly those involving the 
Keystone Medical clinic. Evans was sentenced to forty-two 
(42) months imprisonment and three (3) years supervised 
release for each count, to run concurrently; a $1250 special 
assessment; and payment of $2500 in restitution. The 
supervised release was conditioned upon the 
reimbursement of the costs of Evans' court-appointed 
counsel, in a monthly amount of not less than ten percent 
of his gross monthly income. 
 
During the trial it was revealed that Evans' financial 
affidavit, submitted as part of his application for court- 
appointed counsel, inaccurately represented Evans' and his 
wife's annual joint income as $48,000, when their actual 
joint income was $104,000. Evans testified that the court 
clerk filling out the affidavit had asked about joint take- 
home pay ($48,000), not gross pay ($104,000). At the 
sentencing hearing the court found that Evans had made 
"material misstatements" in his affidavit, and ordered 
Evans to repay the cost of his attorney as a condition of 
supervised release. Upon further questioning by Evans' 
counsel, the court explained that the condition was 
imposed because Evans "had enough income that he was 
not entitled to a Public Defender," and that the condition 
was not punishment for the misrepresentation. 
 
The presentence investigation report stated that the 
amount of loss incurred by the insurance companies was 
$2,851,872.42, and thus exceeded $2.5 million for 
sentencing guideline purposes. A government agent testified 
at the sentencing hearing that he had calculated the 
amount of loss based on insurance company 
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reimbursement checks deposited to the bank accounts of 
the eleven medical clinics and supply companies involved in 
the scheme. On cross-examination, the agent indicated that 
he did not know whether every deposit was associated with 
a staged accident. The district court then found"from the 
preponderance of the evidence [at the sentencing hearing] 
and the trial . . . that the amount of loss as a result of the 
conspiracy for which defendant knowingly took part and 
was expected and foreseeable exceed[ed] 2.5 million 
dollars." Accordingly, Evans' base offense level of six was 
increased thirteen levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1).2 
Evans filed this timely appeal.3 
 
II. 
 
Evans contends that the conditioning of his supervised 
release on the reimbursement of counsel fees is violative of 
the supervised release statute, 18 U.S.C. S 3583. This 
contention was not raised in the district court, and thus we 
review it under the familiar plain error standard set forth 
infra in Part II.D. For the reasons that follow, we find that 
the district court committed plain error requiring the 
exercise of our discretion to vacate the judgment. 
 
The supervised release statute is not open-textured. An 
order may be a condition of supervised release only to the 
extent that it: 
 
       (1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in 
       S 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); 
 
       (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is 
       reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in 
       S 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and 
 
       (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements 
       issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 
       28 U.S.C. S 994(a). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Evans' offense level was further increased two levels, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(2), to a final level of twenty-one because the scheme 
involved multiple victims. 
 
3. The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We 
exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
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18 U.S.C. S 3583(d). Section 3553(a), referenced in 
paragraphs (1) and (2) above, provides for consideration of: 
 
       (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and 
       the history and characteristics of the defendant; 
       [and] 
 
       (2) the need for the sentence imposed -- 
 
       . . . 
 
       (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
       conduct; 
 
       (C) to protect the public from further crimes of t he 
       defendant; and 
 
       (D) to provide the defendant with needed education al 
       or vocational training, medical care, or other 
       correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 
 
The question before us is whether a reimbursement order 
authorized by the Criminal Justice Act ("CJA"), 18 U.S.C. 
S 3006A, which permits a court to order repayment of fees 
for appointed counsel whenever it finds that funds are 
available,4 satisfies the requirements of the supervised 
release statute. This is a question of first impression for us. 
The only other court of appeals to have addressed this 
issue in a published opinion was the Ninth Circuit in 
United States v. Eyler, 67 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1995). The 
Eyler court concluded that a condition requiring 
reimbursement of attorney fees violated the supervised 
release statute because it was not related to the defendant's 
underlying criminal conduct of unlawful possession of 
firearms and "simply bears no relationship" to the pertinent 
statutory goals. See 67 F.3d at 1394; see also United States 
v. Lorenzini, 71 F.3d 1489, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 3006A(f) provides in part: 
 
       Whenever . . . the court finds that funds are available for payment 
       from or on behalf of a person furnished representation, it may 
       authorize or direct that such funds be paid to the appointed 
       attorney, to the bar association or legal aid agency or community 
       defender organization which provided the appointed attorney, . . . 
or 
       to the court for deposit in the Treasury as a reimbursement to the 
       appropriation. . . . 
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on Eyler to conclude without discussion that 
reimbursement of counsel fees is not related to offense of 
bank fraud). Evans contends that his reimbursement 
condition violates the first prong of the supervised release 
statute because it is not "reasonably related" to the nature 
and circumstances of his insurance fraud or to his history 
and characteristics, and does not further the statutory 
goals of deterrence, protection, and rehabilitation. See 18 
U.S.C. S 3583(d)(1); 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D). 
 
A. 
 
As to the factors identified in S 3553(a)(1), we considered 
a cognate question in United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.3d 
155, 165 (3d Cir. 1992), where we held that "[r]ecouping 
the costs of imprisonment has nothing to do with the 
nature or the seriousness of the offense, and hence is not 
authorized under S 3553(a)(1)." In the same vein, 
reimbursement of counsel fees is not related in any tangible 
way to insurance fraud. Furthermore, the reason for 
imposing the condition -- Evans' financial ability to obtain 
a private attorney -- is not a relevant "nature and 
circumstance" of insurance fraud nor, in our view, is it a 
"history and characteristic" of Evans himself. Even if Evans 
had the finances to afford an attorney because of profits 
attained from the fraudulent insurance scheme in which he 
was involved, we do not believe that the profitable nature of 
an offense alone is sufficient to establish a reasonable 
relationship between a reimbursement condition of 
supervised release and the offense of the defendant. 
Otherwise, any financially profitable crime, such as robbery 
or drug dealing, would necessarily be related to the 
repayment of counsel fees (or any other financial condition) 
merely because of the likely financial gain from the crime 
and regardless of the specific "nature and circumstances" of 
the offense, resulting in a defendant's "ability to pay" 
overriding all other relevant considerations. 
 
The government submits that Evans' material 
misstatements on his financial affidavit, which qualified 
him for appointment of counsel, are directly related to his 
filing of fraudulent insurance claims because they represent 
a continuation of the same criminal conduct. It is possible 
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that without the misstatements Evans may not have been 
eligible for court-appointed counsel, 18 U.S.C.S 3006A(b), 
or would have otherwise been subject to a reimbursement 
order, see discussion infra. Furthermore, making 
misstatements on an affidavit is similar in nature and 
character to making fraudulent insurance claims in that 
both acts involve deception and lying. However, as we have 
explained, the district court made it quite clear that the 
reimbursement condition was not imposed because of 
Evans' misstatements, but rather because of hisfinancial 
ability. 
 
Moreover, even if the district court had imposed the 
reimbursement condition because of Evans' misstatements, 
the condition is nonetheless not reasonably related to the 
statutory goals of S 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D). As in Spiropoulos, 
where we found no "reason to believe" that assessing the 
costs of imprisonment acts as a deterrent, protects the 
public, or rehabilitates the defendant, see 976 F.2d at 165- 
66, the government has presented no evidence (nor made 
any argument) that the reimbursement condition would 
serve any of these purposes. We conclude that requiring the 
repayment of counsel fees incurred in defending a 
prosecution would not likely deter crime, protect the public, 
or serve any rehabilitative function. See 18 U.S.C. 
S 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D); Eyler, 67 F.3d at 1394. But cf. United 
States v. Turner, 998 F.2d 534, 536-37 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(concluding that assessment of imprisonment costs deters 
criminal conduct). 
 
B. 
 
The government also relies on cases under the old 
Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. S 3651 (repealed 1984),5 in 
which courts upheld the imposition of repayment of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 3651 provided in part: 
 
       [W]hen satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of 
the 
       public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, [the court] 
       may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the 
       defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and 
       conditions as the court deems best. 
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attorney fees as a condition of probation, for its contention 
that the reimbursement condition satisfies the supervised 
release statute. The cases are inapposite becauseS 3651 is 
materially different from the supervised release statute. The 
language of S 3651 was "broad and inclusive" and provided 
the sentencing court with an "exceptional degree of 
flexibility." United States v. Gurtunca, 836 F.2d 283, 288 
(7th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Missouri Valley 
Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1552 (8th Cir. 1984) (Gibson, 
John R., J., concurring and dissenting), and United States 
v. Alexander, 743 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1984)). See also 
United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 467 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(recognizing that S 3651 grants broad discretion to district 
courts). The only limitation on this power was the court- 
developed "reasonable relationship to the treatment of the 
accused and the protection of the public." United States v. 
Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir. 1977) (quoting 
United States v. Alarik, 439 F.2d 1349, 1351 (8th Cir. 
1971)). 
 
In contrast, the supervised release statute is limited by 
the statutory requirements of S 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(B)-(D), 
see 18 U.S.C. S 3583(d), and thus the imposition of 
conditions on supervised release must satisfy a more 
exacting standard. To the extent that the broad language of 
S 3651 may have been constrained by the same factors 
identified in S 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D), see Beros, 833 F.2d at 467 
(interpreting S 3651 as granting discretion to impose 
conditions reasonably related to rehabilitation of defendant 
and protection of public), the supervised release statute is 
nonetheless further restricted by S 3553(a)(1). See supra 
Part II.A. Consistent with these observations, we note 
support for our position in the Guide to Judiciary Policies 
and Procedures, promulgated by the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts, which states: 
 
       Subsection (f) of [the CJA] does not authorize a judicial 
       officer to require reimbursement as a condition of 
       probation, and the Judicial Conference believes that 
       reimbursement of the cost of representation under the 
       Act should not be made a condition of probation under 
       any other authority. 
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VII Guide to Judiciary Polices and Procedures: Appointment 
and Payment of Counsel P 2.22E (1997). In the context of 
the judiciary guidelines, we believe there is no difference 
between probation and supervised release because 
conditions of probation are now statutorily restricted in the 
same manner as conditions of supervised release. Compare 
18 U.S.C. S 3563(b) (probation statute) with 18 U.S.C. 
S 3583(d) (supervised release statute).6 
 
C. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court clearly 
violated the first requirement of the supervised release 
statute when it imposed a condition that had no reasonable 
relationship to the factors identified in #8E8E # 3553(a)(1) and 
(a)(2)(B)-(D). This, of course, is not to suggest that the 
district court lacks power to order the reimbursement of the 
cost of counsel fees, because the CJA provides for such an 
order. District courts frequently impose such orders at the 
time counsel is appointed, and can in fact do so at any 
time. Furthermore, if a defendant fails to satisfy such an 
order, the district court can seek enforcement by instituting 
contempt proceedings, or by entering a judgment against 
the defendant which will act as a lien against his property. 
See Lorenzini, 71 F.3d at 1493. All we hold is that 
reimbursement of counsel fees could not be effected in this 
case by making it a condition of supervised release. 7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although not at issue in this case, the imposition of conditions under 
the current probation statute likely also necessitates a more restrictive 
analysis than was required under the old statute. See 18 U.S.C. 
S 3563(b) (requiring discretionary conditions to be reasonably related to 
factors set forth in S 3553(a)(1), (2)); Lorenzini, 71 F.3d at 1493-94 
(considering S 3553(a)(1) and (2) factors in rejecting reimbursement of 
counsel fees as condition of probation). 
 
7. Evans has also relied on United States v. Cottman, 142 F.3d 160 (3d 
Cir. 1998), where we addressed the question whether the repayment of 
"buy-money" to the FBI as a condition of supervised release was 
authorized by the supervised release statute. We determined that the 
condition was "restitution," and as such was governed by S 3563(b)(2) 
permitting "restitution to the victim," but concluded that the definition 
of 
"victim" under S 3563(b) was parallel to the definition under the Victim 
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D. 
 
We must still decide whether the district court's mistake 
amounts to a plain error that warrants the exercise of our 
discretion to correct. We believe that it does. As noted 
above, we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52( b); 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). "There 
must be an `error' that is `plain' and that`affect[s] 
substantial rights.' " Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (quoting United 
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (in turn quoting 
United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936))). The 
deviation from a legal rule is "error," and an error is "plain" 
if it is "clear" or "obvious." Id . at 732-34. In most cases, an 
error affects substantial rights if it is prejudicial, i.e., 
"affected the outcome of the district court proceedings." Id. 
at 734. When such an error exists, "the Court of Appeals 
has authority to order correction, but is not required to do 
so." Id. at 735. We will exercise our discretion and vacate 
the sentence if the plain error affecting substantial rights 
also "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Retos, 
25 F.3d 1220, 1229 (3d Cir. 1994) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732). 
 
First, the district court clearly violated the supervised 
release statute, and thus committed error. See Olano, 507 
U.S. at 732-34. The government argues that any purported 
error was not plain because we had not yet addressed the 
propriety of a reimbursement order as a condition of 
supervised release, and because in United States v. 
Chorney, 63 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 1995), the First Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Witness Protection Act, which precluded the government as "victims." Id. 
Accordingly, we held that the repayment condition was unlawful. Id. 
Evans seeks aid from Cottman by arguing that since there is no 
authorization for the reimbursement condition underS 3553, the only 
possible authorization would be from S 3563(b), but that the only 
possibly applicable S 3563(b) provision is paragraph (b)(2) permitting 
"restitution to the victim," which Cottman  held did not apply to the 
government. The government responds that Cottman  is inapplicable to 
the case at bar because it involved restitution, whereas this case 
involves 
reimbursement. We agree with the government, and accordingly do not 
rest our judgment on Cottman. 
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reviewed a similar reimbursement order for compliance with 
the CJA, but did not address the restrictions of the 
supervised release statute. These contentions are without 
merit. Neither the absence of circuit precedent nor the lack 
of consideration of the issue by another court prevents the 
clearly erroneous application of statutory law from being 
plain error. 
 
This error affects substantial rights because, if Evans 
fails to reimburse the cost of his attorney, he would be 
subject to possible incarceration for all or part of the term 
of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. S 3583(e)(3); United 
States v. Dozier, 119 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1997) (error 
affects substantial right to liberty when it extends period of 
restriction on liberty and of governmental supervision). 
Furthermore, imposing a sentence not authorized by law 
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, and reputation of 
the proceedings. Dozier, 119 F.3d at 244-45. Because the 
plain error standard is met, we will exercise our discretion 
and direct that the district court vacate the portion of the 
sentence conditioning Evans' supervised release on the 
repayment of counsel fees.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The district court may, as we mentioned above, impose a 
reimbursement order independent of supervised release if it "finds that 
the person is financially able to obtain counsel or to make partial 
payment for the representation" or "finds that funds are available for 
payment from or on behalf of a person furnished representation." 18 
U.S.C. S 3006A(c), (f). The focus is on the defendant's present ability to 
pay for his representation. See 18 U.S.C.S 3006A(c) (referring to person 
that "is" financially able to obtain counsel); 18 U.S.C. S 3006A(f) 
(referring to funds that "are" available); United States v. Jimenez, 600 
F.2d 1172, 1174 (5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that statute is written in 
present tense). 
 
The burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he is financially unable to reimburse the cost of 
representation. United States v. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d 608, 621 (8th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1527 (1998); United States v. Harris, 707 
F.2d 653, 660 (2d Cir. 1983). Cf. United States v. Gravatt, 868 F.2d 585, 
588 (3d Cir. 1989) (defendant has burden of establishing financial 
eligibility for appointed counsel). However, this does not relieve the 
district court of its responsibility to inquire into the defendant's 
current 
financial status, see United States v. Fraza , 106 F.3d 1050, 1056 (1st 
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III. 
 
Evans also contends that the district court erred in 
determining that the amount of loss from fraudulent 
conduct, for purposes of S 2F1.1 of the sentencing 
guidelines, exceeded $2.5 million. Evans presented this 
objection in the district court. Therefore our review of the 
district court's interpretation of "loss" under S 2F1.1 is 
plenary, and our review of the district court's application of 
the guidelines is governed by the clearly erroneous 
standard. See United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 990 
(3d Cir. 1992). Pursuant to S 2F1.1(b), the specific offense 
characteristics provision for fraud-related crimes, a 
defendant's base offense level is increased by thirteen levels 
when the amount of loss resulting from the fraudulent 
conduct exceeds $2.5 million. The "loss" is the "value of the 
money, property, or services unlawfully taken." U.S.S.G. 
S 2F1.1, application note 7. Although "the loss need not be 
determined with precision," the court must make a 
"reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available 
information." U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, application note 8. 
 
A. 
 
Evans first submits that the court improperly considered 
funds obtained from legitimate insurance claims submitted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Cir. 1997) (remanding for hearing or findings as to defendant's financial 
ability despite government's evidence of defendant's misrepresentations 
on CJA application), taking into account the defendant's personal and 
family needs and the liquidity of his finances, Museitef v. United States, 
131 F.3d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bracewell, 569 F.2d 
1194, 1199 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally VII Guide to Judiciary Policies 
and Procedures P 2.04. 
 
The district court ordered the reimbursement of Evans' counsel fees 
because it found that Evans had been ineligible for court-appointed 
counsel at the time of his CJA application. Thisfinding focused on 
Evans' prior ability to afford counsel, and therefore was inadequate to 
support a reimbursement order. We do not condone Evans' deception, 
intentional or otherwise, and his misstatements clearly raise doubts as 
to his purported inability to afford counsel. Thus, if the district court 
on 
remand wishes to consider imposing a reimbursement order 
(independent of the supervised release sentence), it should conduct an 
appropriate inquiry into Evans' current financial ability to pay for all 
or 
part of his representation. 
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on behalf of legitimate accident victims. We addressed a 
similar issue in United States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304 (3d 
Cir. 1996), where the defendant was convicted of mail fraud 
in connection with the unauthorized practice of law. We 
considered the question whether money paid for 
satisfactory legal services performed by an unlicensed 
attorney should be considered "loss" for purposes of 
S 2F1.1. Id. at 1308. We opined that a proper measurement 
of actual loss must take into account the "nature and 
degree of the harm caused by the offense," and that the 
degree of harm, in turn, depends on the quality of services 
rendered. Id. at 1311-12 (quoting 28 U.S.C.S 994(c)(3)). 
Accordingly, we wrote: 
 
       [t]o the extent that the unauthorized services provided 
       by [the] defendant have not harmed their recipients, 
       but to the contrary have benefitted them, we conclude 
       that [the] defendant's base offense level should not be 
       enhanced. 
 
Id. at 1312. 
 
Thus, the actual loss determination must be predicated 
upon the harm caused by Evans' offenses. Evans was 
convicted of fraud and conspiracy in connection with the 
unauthorized and fraudulent submission of insurance 
claims. To the extent that this activity harmed the 
insurance companies, Evans' sentence should be 
augmented. However, to the extent that any claims were 
legitimate and insurance companies were properly obligated 
to pay them, there was no harm and Evans' sentence 
should not be augmented. 
 
The government contends that Evans presented no 
evidence of legitimate patients at the time of his 
involvement in the scheme, and that to the extent there 
were any legitimate accidents, the claims were inflated. The 
burden, however, is on the government to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence the facts in support of a 
sentence enhancement; the defendant does not have to 
"prove the negative" to avoid the enhanced sentence. United 
States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989). 
Although the burden of production shifts to the defendant 
once the government has made out a prima facie case, the 
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ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the government. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c); United States v. Raven , 39 F.3d 428, 
434-35 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the burden was on the 
government to prove that bank deposits sufficient to 
establish the basis for the loss calculation were for 
illegitimate or inflated claims. Only when the government 
had made such a prima facie showing was Evans required 
to come forward with evidence tending to cast doubt on the 
government's evidence. See Raven, 39 F.3d at 434-35. 
 
The evidence of fraudulent claims was considerable, and 
it may be that the government made a sufficient showing 
that there were no legitimate claims, or that the fraudulent 
claims alone exceeded $2.5 million.9 However, despite the 
extensive record, the district court did not make any 
findings on the record as to the basis for its conclusion that 
the loss exceeded $2.5 million. The district court only made 
a conclusory one sentence statement regarding its loss 
determination. Although the district court's determination 
need not be exact and can be based on the trial record as 
well as the sentencing record, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c), we 
should not be asked to rummage through the entire record 
without guidance from the district court as to the legal and 
factual basis for its determination. In light of our remand 
on the supervised release issue, we direct the district court 
to make findings on the record as to the actual loss 
incurred from fraudulent claims.10 
 
B. 
 
Evans also claims that since his activity was limited to a 
single clinic, the losses from the other ten clinics were not 
foreseeable and should not be attributed to him. The 
district court, in making adjustments based on specific 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The government contends that the $2,851,872.42 amount is a gross 
underestimation of the actual amount of loss, and thus even if there 
were legitimate claims included, the loss still exceeded $2.5 million. 
 
10. We note that if the district court finds that the properly calculated 
loss "does not fully capture the harmfulness and seriousness of the 
conduct," the court may depart upwards from the normal sentencing 
range. U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, application note 10; United States v. Kopp, 951 
F.2d 521, 536 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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offense characteristics, must take into account all conduct 
relevant to the offense. See U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3(a). This 
includes "all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of 
others in furtherance of [a] jointly undertaken criminal 
activity." U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). In making the 
accomplice attribution assessment, the court must consider 
whether the loss resulting from the actions of co- 
conspirators was (1) "in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity," (2) within "the scope of the 
criminal activity the . . . defendant agreed to jointly 
undertake," and (3) "reasonably foreseeable in connection 
with that criminal activity." U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, application 
note 2. In explaining the operation of S 1B1.3 in Collado, we 
stated that "it is not enough to merely determine that the 
defendant's criminal activity was substantial." 975 F.2d at 
995. The sentencing court must conduct "a searching and 
individualized inquiry into the circumstances surrounding 
each defendant's involvement in the conspiracy" in order to 
"ensure that the defendant's sentence accurately reflects 
his or her role" and agreement. Id. 
 
The district court concluded, without making any 
references on the record to specific evidence, that the losses 
caused by the eleven clinics were "a result of the conspiracy 
. . . and foreseeable" to Evans. This finding is inadequate to 
support the sentence because it appears to focus on the 
scope of the conspiracy as a whole, rather than on the 
scope of Evans' undertaking and involvement as required. 
See id. at 991. The conspiracy, which involved eleven 
medical clinics and supply companies owned and operated 
by Alexander Grichener and Vladimir Shats, was quite 
extensive. There is evidence that clearly indicates that 
Evans was involved with Keystone Medical, and which also 
suggests that Evans was involved with other clinics. 11 But, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Evans acted on behalf of Keystone Medical in Pittsburgh by opening 
a bank account and being the signatory on the account, leasing office 
space, and representing the clinic at a zoning board hearing. Evans was 
a participant in a staged accident in Solebury, Pennsylvania in May 
1993, and submitted fraudulent claims for the accident to an insurance 
company. He also purchased car insurance and recruited participants 
for a November 1993 accident in Brooklyn, New York, and posed as a 
claimant in a subsequent meeting with an insurance adjuster 
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there is no indication that the district court made a 
"searching and individualized inquiry" into the extent of 
Evans' involvement, or the extent to which the co- 
conspirators' conduct was in furtherance of and foreseeable 
from Evans' undertaking. Consequently, on remand, the 
district court should conduct further individualized fact 
finding as to the accomplice conduct attributable to Evans. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
and remand for further sentencing proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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investigating the accident. Evans also received various payments during 
the course of the conspiracy from clinics other than Keystone Medical, 
and he met with Grichener on various occasions at a New York clinic. 
However, while the indictment cited twenty staged accidents, there does 
not appear to be evidence of Evans' involvement in more than two. 
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